Abstract
Introduction
When it comes to developing solutions to global environmental concerns, and many other international environmental concerns, the United States is the elephant next door. Its environmental footprint is larger than that of other nations. 3 Its share of global resource consumption is considerably larger than its share of world population. 4 On many issues, US cooperation is therefore indispensable for problemsolving. Its technological and financial resources enable the United States to make decisive contributions to international environmental protection efforts. Its economic and strategic power gives the United States a distinctive ability to influence and shape international environmental law and politics. Thus, US leadership has a unique potential to promote the development of international environmental law. Conversely, when the United States declines to exercise leadership, the impact is significant. For many observers, the US decision in 2001 to abandon the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 5 encapsulates an alarming trend in American attitudes towards international environmental law. Not only is the United States said to be disengaging, 6 and increasingly inclined towards unilateral action. 7 Worse, suggest some, Kyoto stands for the readiness of the current administration to undermine multilateral approaches to global environmental problems. 8 Yet, if President Bush's statement on the Kyoto Protocol is any guide, the United States is not actually abdicating its leadership role. On the contrary, it is exercising leadership precisely by walking away from an agreement that is misguided in its approach. The resistance, then, is not to environmental multilateralism but to multilateralism for multilateralism's sake, and to multilateral efforts that are not likely to produce results. 9 These conflicting assessments beg the question: Where does US policy on international environmental law in fact stand? In this article, I explore recent trends in US approaches. I begin by canvassing the trajectory of US practice since around the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio. This review suggests that some shifts in US policy have indeed occurred, but that it would be a mistake to treat one event -the US withdrawal from Kyoto -as representative of the nature of these shifts. I then examine a range of possible explanations for the changing US approach to international environmental law. These include factors related to the growth of treaty regimes and institutional structures, factors related to American power, domestic politics and attitudes towards international law, and factors specifically related to the administration of George W. Bush. Both the review of US practice and the assessment of factors that might account for American policy suggest that the international environmental law community must carefully distinguish short-term developments from longer-term trends. 10 Convention on Biological Diversity, reprinted in 31 ILM (1992) 818; FCCC, supra note 5. regarding the development of international environmental law and problem-solving through multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), the Earth Summit had an ambitious agenda. Two global agreements, on biological diversity and on climate change, 10 were opened for signature at the conference, along with a declaration on principles of international environmental law, 11 a statement of principles on forest protection, 12 and an agenda for global environmental policy. 13 However, for all the green enthusiasm of many states and non-governmental organizations, the US administration of George Bush Snr was a reluctant participant in the conference. 14 Since the Rio Conference, the United States seems to have become increasingly wary of international mega-conference diplomacy, multilateral environmental treaty regimes, and efforts to develop customary international environmental law. Thus, although the US Government continues to express a desire to lead on international environmental issues, 15 it appears to be shifting some of its attention from multilateral legal strategies to alternative avenues for shaping relevant policy agendas. The following discussion does not purport to provide an exhaustive assessment of US practice regarding international environmental law. It focuses on key MEAs adopted over the last 10-15 years and highlights key policy themes.
A Multilateral Environmental Agreements

Existing Assessments of Leadership and Compliance
In an assessment published in 1998, Michael Glennon and Alison Stewart concluded that the United States had exercised leadership in environmental treaty negotiations, and had a good record of compliance with treaties that it had ratified. 16 This assessment was based on a review of one executive agreement, the 1985 International Tropical Timber Agreement, 17 Glennon and Stewart, supra note 16, at 175. 20 Ibid., at 177-196. 21 Ibid., at 174. The US provided over $1.4 billion in assistance to other countries under MEAs, but 25% less than pledged under the Climate Convention and 6% less than pledged under the Montreal Protocol. While the US submitted 'nearly all' 21 MEA reports required between 1997 to mid-2002, about half were 2-8 months late, two were never submitted. See US GAO, supra note 22, at 6-11. 25 See Turner, supra note 15.
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Glennon and Stewart, supra note 16, at 176.
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. 18 According to Glennon and Stewart, American leadership was instrumental in initiating and shaping all four of the MEAs. 19 In all four cases, the United States moved quickly to sign and ratify the agreements, and to take legislative and other action for domestic implementation. 20 To the extent that there were any shortfalls in compliance with these agreements, they appear to relate primarily to reporting commitments and funding commitments.
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Similar conclusions were reached in a 2002 assessment of US compliance with environmental agreements by the US General Accounting Office (GAO). 22 The assessment reviewed, inter alia, compliance with CITES, the Montreal Protocol, the 1992 Climate Change Convention, and the 1994 Desertification Convention. 23 The GAO found that deficiencies in US compliance related largely to reporting and financial assistance commitments. 24 However, in the latter context, it should be noted that the United States also remains the single largest contributor to the Global Environment Facility, the World Bank mechanism through which much international environmental protection funding is provided.
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At first glance, these assessments suggest that the United States has been an active and committed participant in international environmental treaty regimes. However, US leadership and its good ratification and implementation record on the reviewed agreements do not permit strong inferences about current US attitudes towards environmental treaty-making. Three of the four treaties reviewed by Glennon and Stewart were part of the first wave of environmental agreements adopted in the early 1970s. At the time, environmental concern in the United States was generally high. 26 Similarly, concern over the thinning of the ozone layer and a range of domestic regulatory efforts preceded, and help explain, US international leadership on ozone 27 See R.E. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy: New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet (1991), at 6; Glennon and Stewart, supra note 16, at 176, 198 This comment applies also to the some of the agreements covered in the Glennon and Stewart assessment. For example, while the United States is a party to the London Convention on Ocean Dumping, and has a good compliance record, it has yet to ratify the 1996 Protocol to the convention, dealing with dumping of hazardous materials at sea. See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. 33 The list of signatures and ratifications to the FCCC, supra note 5, is accessible at http://unfccc.int/ (accessed 25 January 2004). depletion. 27 In addition, commitments under the Montreal Protocol are focused on a discreet set of chemicals, which proved to be relatively easily replaced by alternative substances. 28 In turn, the GAO's assertion of good US overall compliance with commitments under the Climate Change Convention is tempered by the fact that the convention contained no legally binding emission reduction commitments, and that a non-binding commitment to stabilize emissions by the year 2000 was not actually met. 29 Finally, commitments under the Desertification Convention, which it ratified in 2000, 30 are limited to broad obligations to cooperate with other countries through community-level participation, general cooperation and partnerships to uphold the purposes of the convention. 
Recent Patterns of Participation and Ratification
There can be little doubt that the United States takes its treaty commitments seriously. However, its compliance record is only part of the story. For present purposes, the more important angle is American willingness to enter into treaties in the first place.
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On this score, US enthusiasm for international environmental law appears to have diminished since the Rio Summit. This trend is reflected in the US approach both to the Rio agreements and to other MEAs that were negotiated in the 1990s, which the United States has tended not to ratify.
Although the United States was supportive of the Climate Change Convention, which it had ratified in 1992, 33 the Kyoto Protocol to the convention met with resistance. Under President Clinton, the United States was actively engaged in the negotiation of the protocol and influenced significant parts of the regime, such as its emissions-trading and compliance mechanisms. 34 However, the Clinton administration failed to forge bipartisan support for the protocol. 35 45 Ibid., at 557. unanimous Senate resolution against the protocol.
36 When President Clinton nonetheless signed the protocol in 1998, he stipulated that he would not recommend ratification unless the protocol was adjusted to address US concerns. 37 The Bush administration rejected the Kyoto Protocol as flawed in 2001 . 38 Since that time, the US approach to the international climate change regime has ranged from mere observation of negotiations, to efforts to convince other states (notably developing countries) of the protocol's flaws, to emphasis on domestic approaches to the issue. 39 In the latter context, the Bush administration's action plan on climate change, designed to reduce the 'greenhouse gas intensity' of the American economy and relying on voluntary action, has been widely judged as lacking credibility. 40 The weakness of the Bush administration's policy appears to have prompted several legislative proposals to better deal with climate change, by both Democratic and Republican congressmen. 41 But, for the moment, the most promising domestic climate change policies may be the many regulatory and other initiatives that have sprouted at state and local levels.
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The United States is still not a party to the other nearly universal Rio agreement, the Convention on Biological Diversity. 43 The Clinton administration signed the convention in 1993 and made several efforts to obtain the advice and consent of the US Senate. 44 However, the Senate process eventually stalled in the final years of the Clinton administration and there do not appear to be any current efforts to enable ratification of the Biodiversity Convention. 45 Nevertheless, the United States was fully engaged in the negotiations for a protocol on transboundary shipment of genetically modified organisms. As one of the largest producers of biotech crops and other food stuffs or animal feed, the United States was concerned that trade in modified products 46 See Stewart not be unduly restricted. 46 In particular, the United States sought to limit states' ability to restrict the import of biotech products on precautionary grounds. Instead, it sought to ensure that any import restrictions be justified on the basis of risk assessments and scientific evidence. 47 Through alliances with other exporters of biotech products, such as Canada, Australia and Argentina, the United States was indeed able to exert considerable influence on what became the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Biodiversity Convention. 48 But given that even its ratification of the convention is uncertain, it is currently unlikely that the United States will join the 87 developed and developing country parties to the Biosafety Protocol. 49 The US ratification record on other major MEAs negotiated since Rio has also been sluggish. For example, the United States declares itself to be a leader in 'efforts to control toxic chemicals around the world ' . 50 Yet, due to protracted domestic deliberations, the United States has yet to ratify any of the key chemicals-related treaties: the 1996 Protocol to the London Convention on Ocean Dumping, 51 The United States is a party to the London Convention on Ocean Dumping. 55 However, it has not ratified the 1996 protocol to the convention that limits dumping of hazardous materials at sea and that is intended to replace the original convention.
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On hazardous wastes, although it signed the Basel Convention in 1989 and the US Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification in 1992, the United States remains the only OECD country not to have ratified the treaty. 57 The transboundary movements of hazardous wastes and to ensure the safe transfer and disposal of such wastes. In part modelled on US regulatory approaches, it requires that importing states receive advance written notice of waste shipments and information on the nature of the wastes to be shipped, and requires that importing states provide advance written consent to any shipment. 58 According to some observers, there are only limited incentives for American ratification. 59 While the United States is a significant producer of hazardous wastes, only 1 per cent of that waste is exported, with the bulk going to neighbouring Canada. 60 In addition, ratification would require a series of complex changes in domestic law. 61 Nonetheless, it appears that the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is now beginning to work on the required implementing legislation, partly as a vehicle for legislative changes to provide the EPA with better authority to monitor waste shipments between the United States and Canada, including a recent increase in waste shipments from Canada to the United States.
62
Under the Rotterdam Convention on Prior Informed Consent, 63 states are obliged to notify and obtain the consent of importing states to shipments of any chemicals or pesticides that those states have banned or severely restricted. The United States signed this convention in 1998. While the currently 61 parties to the convention include most developed countries, several developed countries other than the United States also remain outside the treaty. 64 The Bush administration has introduced implementing legislation and is seeking Senate approval of US ratification of the convention.
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The United States has also been supportive of efforts to develop a global regime to eliminate the production and use of certain persistent organic pollutants (POPs). American involvement in the negotiation process began under President George Bush Snr shortly after the Rio Summit and then had the strong support of the Clinton Ibid., at 136-142.
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Ibid., at 145-146. administration. 66 Yet, unlike the majority of other states participating in the negotiations, the United States was reluctant to support 'elimination' of some of the targeted POPs. The United States was also hesitant to make commitments on funding and assistance for developing countries and, again, resisted reliance on the precautionary principle, notably in respect of procedures for the addition of new chemicals to the regime. 67 In this latter context, the United States lobbied successfully to gain support of developing country delegations for a mechanism for the addition of new substances that emphasizes science-based risk assessment. Thus, while the convention contains various references to the precautionary principle, the principle was not included in the provisions on the addition of new chemicals. 68 The Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants was adopted in May 2001 and signed by the United States on that occasion. It currently has 53 parties, excluding several major developed countries and the European Community. 69 In 2002, the Bush administration submitted the convention to the Senate for its advice and consent. 70 However, the mechanism for the addition of new substances has proven to be one of the sticking points in the domestic process as well. 71 The administration favoured case-by-case revision of domestic legislation, whereas a competing proposal operated on the basis of a rebuttable presumption that new chemicals added to the POPs treaty would be regulated domestically. 72 Although ratification of the Stockholm Convention is a declared 'high priority' of the Bush administration, 73 the new chemicals issue remains unresolved.
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On the issue of long-range transboundary air pollution, the United States' approach has been selective. After many years of prodding by Canada, the United States agreed in 1991 bilaterally to curb emissions of air pollutants related to the phenomenon of acid rain. 75 It has also been a hesitant participant in multilateral efforts to reduce long-range transboundary air pollution. The United States is a party to the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, a framework agreement that was adopted under the auspices of the UN Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) 76 Since then, eight protocols have been negotiated to address different types of air pollutants and emissions monitoring. 77 The United States has signed all protocols, except two that concern sulphur emissions. 78 However, like other parties to the framework convention, it has joined only some of the protocols. It is a party to the 1984 Geneva Protocol on Long-term Financing of the Cooperative Programme for Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long-range Transmission of Air Pollutants in Europe (EMEP), the 1994 Sofia Protocol concerning the Control of Emissions of Nitrogen Oxides or their Transboundary Fluxes, and the 1998 Aarhus Protocol on Heavy Metals. 79 The 1998 Aarhus Protocol on Persistent Organic Pollutants bans the production and use of some POPs and stipulates phase-outs and emission reductions for others. 80 It appears that the Bush administration has yet to decide whether or not to seek ratification of this protocol, which the United States signed in 1998. However, it is in the process of securing legislative changes that would permit ratification. 81 Finally, at the level of procedural approaches to environmental protection, the US participation record is limited. As already noted, the United States is not currently a party to the Rotterdam Convention on Prior Informed Consent. It signed the 1991 Espoo Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment on the occasion of its adoption, but has not yet become a party to the convention. All Western European countries and Canada are parties to this ECE-sponsored convention. 82 The 1998 Aarhus Convention on Public Participation largely reflects US domestic law on access The Tribunal concluded that US law was 'in conformity with the general rules of international law' and proceeded to rely primarily on American law. The latter was applicable based on the parties' agreement. Trail Smelter case, supra note 86, at 1908, 1963. 89 Birnie and Boyle, supra note 28, at 115-121. to information and public participation. 83 Notwithstanding this fact, the United States is virtually alone among ECE states in not having signed this convention.
84
B Customary Environmental Law
The genesis of one of the cornerstone principles of international environmental law, the prohibition against causation of significant transboundary environmental harm, 85 is closely linked to the United States. One of the sources to which this principle is typically traced back is the arbitral award in the Trail Smelter case, which arose between the United States and Canada in the early part of the 20th century. 86 Emissions from the smelter, located just north of the US border in the Canadian province of British Columbia, caused significant environmental and property damage in Washington State. 87 In rendering its award, and formulating the now foundational 'no harm' rule, the tribunal drew strongly on US law on inter-state pollution and concluded almost in passing that international law corresponded to the principles found in American law. 88 In the Trail Smelter arbitration, the United States was likely driven more by the need to resolve a local pollution concern than by a concerted effort to develop international law. Be that as it may, today, the US attitude towards the development of customary environmental law appears to be one of reluctance. This assessment applies in particular to the principles that have been articulated since the 1980s in order to push international environmental law beyond its focus on transboundary and territorial harm, and to recognize the differing circumstances of developed and developing countries. Given space constraints, suffice it to highlight the two most prominent of these principles. The precautionary principle aims to promote environmental protection, notwithstanding the lack of scientific certainty that harm will occur. In the context of risks of serious or irreversible environmental harm, the principle is designed to overcome the fact that the no harm rule imposes obligations only where there is clear evidence of harm causation. 89 In turn, the concept of common but differentiated 90 Ibid., at 100-104. 91 See Rio Declaration, supra note 11, Principle 7 (common but differentiated responsibilities) and Principle 15 (precautionary principle). 92 See Both the precautionary principle and the concept of common but differentiated responsibilities have found expression in the Rio Declaration. 91 Similarly, both concepts are reflected in the design of global MEAs adopted over the last decade or so. Indeed, the Climate Convention, and several other MEAs adopted since Rio, incorporate the two principles. 92 Although the United States was reluctant to do so, and worked to restrict the scope of both principles, it did accept their inclusion in the Rio instruments. 93 However, since the Rio Conference, the United States has sought to contain the influence of the two principles and has consistently denied their status as customary international law. 94 As mentioned earlier in this article, the United States resisted inclusion of the precautionary principle in MEAs, such as the Biosafety Protocol or POPs Convention. 95 And while, in each case, the principle was eventually included in the agreement, the United States worked to limit inclusion to preambular or other non-operative provisions. In part, US resistance to the principle is rooted in the concern that it might serve as a pretext for other states to restrict the import of US goods. US denial of the precautionary principle's customary status thus straddles the realm of MEAs and the realm of international trade law.
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As for the concept of common but differentiated responsibilities, US concerns relate to a number of issues. 97 At one level, the United States is intent on resisting any possible implication that it bears legal responsibility for global environmental problems, such as climate change. Similarly, it is looking to resist arguments that past contributions to a given environmental concern, or current capacity to address it, predetermine MEA commitments and design. Notably, the resistance is to claims that, 98 These concerns were first raised in relation to as a general proposition, developed countries must take the lead in assuming MEA obligations, that developing countries' responsibilities are by definition reduced, and that any action by developing countries must be financially and technically supported by developed countries.
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In short, while the United States may be supportive of individual MEAs that reflect precautionary approaches to environmental protection and provide for differentiated commitments, it is sceptical of the value of broad customary principles that would require such approaches across the board. 99 Notwithstanding the American position, the precautionary principle is said by many observers to have acquired customary law status. 100 The customary law status of the concept of common but differentiated responsibilities remains more widely contested.
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C Alternative Approaches to International Environmental Law
US attitudes towards international environmental law are only partially reflected in its approaches to MEAs and customary law. An equally significant part of the picture is the increasing American reliance on alternative legal strategies. Three themes can be discerned in this move to alternatives. First, there are some indications of renewed willingness to take unilateral action to address international environmental concerns. Second, a concerted effort seems to be underway to shape policy outcomes at the regional level. Finally, the United States places increasing emphasis on engaging individuals, corporations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in international environmental protection.
Unilateral Approaches
Unilateral acts in the name of environmental protection are neither a new phenomenon, nor the exclusive domain of the United States. Nor, for that matter, is environmental unilateralism necessarily illegal.
102 Nonetheless, when the most powerful state in the world resorts to unilateral measures, suspicions and concerns tend to be aroused. Frequently, the suspicion is that US actions are not intended simply to protect the environment, but cater also, or even primarily, to economic or other interests. Another concern is that the United States is using unilateral tactics either to force the development of international law in a particular direction or, even worse, is charting its own course regardless of international law. Two broad types of unilateral approaches can be distinguished, both of which the United States has taken over the last decade.
First, unilateralism may consist in a refusal to join in a multilateral effort to address 103 a concern that requires collective action. 103 The Bush administration has been accused of this type of unilateralist stance on a number of issues, its withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol being the most prominent environmental example. 104 In the case of Kyoto, the flashpoint was not merely American unilateralism as such, but its potentially destructive impact on the multilateral effort. The US stance thus raised strong objections, notwithstanding the fact that, strictly as a matter of international law, the decision not to ratify was simply an exercise of sovereign rights. 105 Second, unilateralism may consist in a range of actions. At one end of the spectrum are go-it-alone policy approaches to issues that require coordinated collective action. The American domestic climate change action plan is one example of such unilateralism. 106 At the other end of the spectrum are unilateral actions that are specifically designed to change the behaviour of other states. The import restrictions imposed by the United States in the Tuna-Dolphin and Shrimp-Turtle cases were controversial examples of these latter types of actions. 107 The declared goal was to protect migratory, and in the case of the sea turtles, endangered species. In both cases the United States ultimately imposed the domestic regulatory standards applicable to its fishing industry on activities undertaken by other states in their own jurisdictional spheres or in international waters. 108 What raised international ire in each case was a perceived US push for extra-territorial application of its laws, and a failure to work for multilateral agreements on species protection.
However, neither case can be attributed purely to US protectionism of its own fishing industries or blunt flexing of unilateralist muscle. Long policy development processes preceded the adoption of the species protection programmes. 109 And in both cases, the US import restrictions were at least in part prompted by domestic litigation, through which environmental groups compelled full enforcement of American law. 110 Furthermore, in the Shrimp-Turtle case, the United States adjusted its regulations to be more responsive to multilateral concerns and these adjustments were upheld by the That said, one recent case in which the United States appears intent on applying domestic law to an entity located outside of US territory may be indicative of an increased willingness to exert unilateral pressure rather than engage internationally. 113 There is some irony in the fact that this potential shift in approach is related to none other than the keystone case of international environmental lawthe Trail Smelter case. The smelter, now operated by the Canadian company Teck Cominco, has continued to raise transboundary environmental concerns over the last few decades. 114 A particular concern relates to the deposit of mining slag into the upper Columbia River, and to the damage that is alleged to result in waters south of the Canada-US border. 115 In 1999, American Indian tribes located on Lake Roosevelt in Washington State petitioned the US EPA under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) to assess hazardous substance contamination along the river. 116 The EPA exerted some pressure on the Canadian company to cooperate on testing water samples, and to accept the relevant process under CERCLA. 117 Teck Cominco offered to pay $US13 million for independent studies, but refused to submit itself to a US regulatory process. 118 In December 2003, the EPA issued an administrative order requiring Teck Cominco to investigate the contamination and explore clean-up options. 119 Teck Cominco has refused to comply with this order and, in January 2004, the Canadian Government issued a diplomatic note in which it registered its concern over the US actions.
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What to make of these developments surrounding the Trail Smelter? First, as in the Tuna-Dolphin and Shrimp-Turtle cases, there appeared to be some domestic pressure for action. However, unlike in those two cases, there was no litigation that compelled government action, but simply a petition. Second, some arguments can be mustered for the validity of the application of US law under international law. Under the objective territorial principle, it may well be possible to argue that the United States has jurisdiction over pollution that originates abroad but causes harm in American territory. 121 Yet, third, if this type of argument were indeed to be made, it would represent a significant departure from common practice surrounding transboundary pollution issues, both as between Canada and the United States and internationally. 122 That practice has consistently involved resolution of the concern through diplomatic processes or resort to inter-state dispute settlement. The original Trail Smelter case is the embodiment of that approach. In the current situation, available avenues for resolution of the issue range from diplomatic engagement to referral of the issue to the US-Canada International Joint Commission. The very task of the commission is to address concerns pertaining to boundary waters between the United States and Canada. 123 It is too early to tell whether the United States will follow through with the current approach. Nonetheless, the fact that the EPA order was issued in the first place is remarkable. A significant precedent would be set if the United States were indeed to choose enforcement of domestic law over the range of other available options, especially in view of the long history of environmental cooperation between the two countries. There are some indications of disagreement within the US Government as to the best approach to the Trail Smelter. Whereas some indeed seem to see the situation as a test case, including for concerns along the Mexican border, 124 others seem less convinced of the wisdom of such a precedent. 125 
Regional Approaches and Environmental Hubs
Greater US reliance on regional environmental diplomacy was first advocated in the early 1990s. 126 A prominent example of this turn to regionalism is the regional environmental hub programme. It was under the Clinton administration that the United States began a concerted effort to 'mainstream' global environmental issues into its broader foreign policy agenda. 127 132 Wadley, supra note 127, at 574-580. 133 Ibid., at 590-592. 134 Ibid., at 584-585, 598. 135 global stability will 'fall short unless people have a livable environment'. 128 In her foreword to the report, then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright announced:
To meet this challenge, the State Department is changing the way we do business.. . . Our embassies and bureaus are developing regional environmental policies that advance our larger national interests. To help coordinate these policies, we are opening regional environmental hubs. . .
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The United States now operates such regional environmental hubs out of 12 of its embassies around the world. 130 Through these hubs, the United States promotes cooperation on regional environmental or natural resource concerns. Although initially criticized by some observers as undue 'greening' of US foreign policy, 131 the regional hub approach has proven successful. It has provided the United States with opportunities for collation-building, and with relatively greater scope for influencing policy outcomes than might be the case in global or other large multilateral settings.
132 A review of the hub programme conducted in 2002 highlighted the opportunities it provides not just for environmental protection but also for progress on US concerns in the trade, security and political realms.
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The Bush administration has embraced the hub approach and appears to utilize it as part of a broadening agenda for promoting US foreign policy interests. After September 11, 2001, regional diplomacy around environmental concerns appears to be one strand in a larger strategy to promote democracy, the rule of law and prosperity, all of which are seen as crucial to the promotion of long-term security interests. 135 This policy focus on private sector engagement in sustainable development has a substantive and a financial dimension.
Substantively, the Bush administration argued that the Johannesburg Summit should not focus on the development of further environmental regimes or new commitments, but on better implementation of existing international environmental law. While the United States was not alone in this view, 136 it was one of the strongest advocates of private sector engagement as an alternative to conventional international approaches. 137 Rather than on state-level, or 'Type I', outcomes, the Johannesburg Summit should focus on so-called 'Type II' outcomes: voluntary public-private partnerships that could actually promote results on the ground. The two-pronged approach was endorsed in the preparatory processes for the summit. However, there was considerable debate on whether or not 'Type II' partnerships should be developed in the context of consensus-based international legal frameworks, 138 or should be strictly voluntary 'coalitions of the willing'. 139 Advocates of the former approach were concerned that, unless Type II partnerships were placed within the context of specific commitments, they would not actually assist the better implementation of international environmental law. 140 This concern was amplified by the American resistance to the establishment of an international review process for Type II partnerships. 141 In the end, the Johannesburg Summit affirmed the key role of voluntary public-private partnerships. 142 No review mechanism was agreed upon, but the summit documents emphasize the importance of corporate accountability at various points. 143 The Bush administration's sustainable development funding initiatives mirror the substantive focus on public-private partnerships. At the Monterrey Summit, the United States declined to join international initiatives or pledges on development assistance and, instead, announced a number of unilateral aid commitments. 144 In particular, American development assistance would now be distributed through the 'Global Development Alliance' initiative, and thus largely through partnerships with NGOs, private foundations and corporations. 145 The underlying goal is to harness the billions of private dollars that circulate the globe, amounts that far outweigh public development assistance. 146 However, so runs the argument, private parties will not invest in unstable environments. In order to channel the money to where it is most needed, the groundwork of transparency and rule of law must be in place. 147 Therefore, a central plank of the US sustainable development policy announcements at the Johannesburg Summit was the emphasis on financially supporting countries that have 'a strong commitment to good governance, . . . the health and education of their people, and economic policies that foster enterprise and foster entrepreneurship'. 148 To this end, the United States announced five public-private partnership programmes. 149 
Explaining US (Dis)engagement
The previous section has revealed several key themes -and shifts -in US approaches to international environmental law. How can these trends in US policy towards international environmental law be explained? In this section, I explore a range of explanations for the apparent caution vis-à-vis multilateral regime-building projects, and the increasing enthusiasm for various alternative approaches.
A The Growth of MEAs
Over the last three decades, there has been a significant growth not only in the number of MEAs, 150 but also in the nature and density of the resultant agreements. Of the 41 'core' environmental conventions of global significance identified by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in a 2001 report, 31 have been adopted since 1985. 151 In discussing this trend, commentators now often speak not of international environmental law but of 'international environmental governance'. 152 Indeed, most of the recent MEAs are not simply treaties, but regimes that generate ongoing law-making activities around various issue areas. The primary approach to global MEA design today is the 'framework-protocol' model, first employed at the global level by the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and its 1987 Montreal Protocol. 153 Typically, the initial framework treaty contains only general commitments and establishes information-gathering and decision-making structures. Subsequent protocols to the framework treaty provide binding emission reduction or other environmental protection commitments.
The framework-protocol approach is designed to promote consensus building around the need for and parameters of collective action, to focus binding commitments on priority concerns, and to adapt or expand the regime over time. 154 This regime development is accomplished through regular meetings of the treaty's Conference of the Parties (COP) and its various scientific and political subsidiary bodies. 155 With an institutional core and ongoing regulatory agenda, modern MEAs therefore resemble international organizations in many respects. 156 Treaty parties become participants in rolling information gathering, negotiation and consensusbuilding processes, and COPs have emerged as forums for much of the international environmental law-making activity. 157 In these ongoing multilateral processes, it is more difficult for individual parties to determine agendas, to resist regime development, and to extricate themselves from regime dynamics. 158 In addition, a range of techniques have evolved that facilitate treaty development by COP decision, reducing reliance on formal amendments and softening consent requirements in various ways. 159 Even this brief overview of MEA growth suggests a number of reasons why the early pattern of US leadership on treaty development and quick ratification may have abated. 160 First, and most importantly, the ongoing interactions and negotiations among parties to an MEA tend to generate patterns of expectations and normative understandings that guide and constrain subsequent policy choices and legal development within the regime. 161 In addition, these multilateral negotiations provide opportunities for coalition building that enhance the ability of smaller states to influence outcomes and help dilute the influence of more powerful states. Second, the sheer number and the growing complexity of MEAs make multilateral engagement increasingly resource-intensive. 162 Significant human and financial resources are 163 Ibid., at 7-8, 37-41. 164 Anderson and Grewell, supra note 131, at 436. 165 required in the development of MEAs, as well as in the various ongoing multilateral engagements once agreements are adopted. Increasingly, agreements are also tackling complex global issues in which environmental concerns are intertwined with development issues. The environment-development dimension to most global MEAs not only entails protracted negotiation processes. Typically, global environmental governance also requires significant financial and technological transfers from North to South. 163 Finally, the easier agreements have likely been reached already, so that the remaining treaties tend to impose more onerous obligations. Thus, rather than target relatively discrete issues of international concern, MEAs now tackle matters that implicate the domestic spheres of parties to a growing extent, and often require significant adjustments of domestic regulatory standards or approaches. 164 Most of these factors play out not just for the United States but also for other countries. This fact arguably accounts for the non-ratification of some of the most recent MEAs by other developed countries, including some with strong commitments to environmental protection. Yet, if the proliferation and growing density of MEAs has spawned a degree of 'green fatigue' internationally, 165 the phenomenon is probably amplified in the case of the United States. While the country may have greater human and resources than other participants in international environmental governance, it is also usually called upon to make large contributions to cover the costs of MEAs. 166 This fact, and a growing apprehension of the influence and intrusiveness of international institutions commitments, likely helps explain the rougher rides that MEAs are getting in US domestic processes. I turn first to the features of the relevant domestic processes, and then to other considerations that suggest that the United States is particularly likely to look long and hard before it leaps into international environmental law.
B Domestic Political and Legal Processes
The features of the American political process can complicate a treaty's ratification at the best of times. As is well known, ratification of a treaty requires the 'advice and consent' of a two-thirds majority of the US Senate. 167 Environmental agreements can thus become mired in the deliberations of the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee, and are exposed to political lobbying by an array of domestic constituencies. This dynamic is magnified when MEAs require reopening the carefully negotiated compromises that are contained in many US domestic environmental laws.
The current Bush administration is generally said to accord relatively low priority to environmental protection. 168 Yet, even the reasonably enthusiastic Clinton-Gore administration was not able to significantly advance its international environmental agenda through the obstacle course of competing domestic agendas that it inherited in the Senate. 169 For example, in 1992, just prior to the Clinton presidency, some Senators called for US leadership at Rio. At the same time, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee declared that '[t]he President should not support any action or undertake any commitment' regarding international environmental conventions, strategies or action plans at Rio 'which he believes would have an adverse effect on the competitiveness of American industry or that could result in a net long-term loss of American jobs'. 170 As already noted, the Clinton administration subsequently signed the Biodiversity Convention but failed in its efforts to shepherd the Biodiversity Convention through the Senate in 1993-1994; Senate resistance to ratification continues to this date. 171 Another case in point is the 1997 Byrd-Hagel resolution, in which the Senate resolved that the United States should not sign any protocol that created new emission reduction commitments for developed countries without complementary developing country commitments, and that would result in serious harm to the US economy. ratification of MEAs, as previously discussed, or to dismantle environmental protection. 178 Some commentators suggest that the distinctive features of domestic processes also help explain American reluctance vis-à-vis the development of customary law. For example, Jonathan Wiener argues that the 'highly legalistic and adversarial' character of its regulatory system is one reason why the United States has resisted acceptance of an internationally binding precautionary principle. 179 Specifically, resort to courts for citizen suits to enforce regulatory standards, or tort actions for compensation, is said to be far more pervasive in the United States than in Europe, where the precautionary principle tends to be treated as customary law. 180 As a result, US negotiators may be more likely than their counterparts to read a negotiated text as domestically enforceable law. By the same token, negotiators may be concerned that Europe will not end up with genuinely equivalent commitments, since enforcement by domestic actors is less likely. 181 This phenomenon, argues Wiener, may further erode the basis for an agreed international statement of the precautionary principle. 182 This concern applies notwithstanding the fact that, according to Wiener, European and American precautionary standards are ultimately much closer than generally assumed. 183 Domestic legal culture may well be one reason for US resistance to the development of customary law, such as in the case of the precautionary principle. However, in the environmental context, it seems more likely that the primary reasons for the US posture on custom are to be found in international legal processes. Whereas a non-binding precautionary principle may shape international regimes or even influence interpretative processes, a customary rule would be actionable through WTO or other dispute settlement processes. 184 It could qualify the requirement of science-based justification for protective measures, upon which the United States insists internationally as well as in its domestic risk management approaches. 185 Similarly, legally binding common but differentiated responsibilities would significantly alter the structure and processes of international environmental law by enshrining a basic distribution of global environmental obligations between South and North.
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C American Attitudes towards International Law
American enthusiasm for grand multilateral projects, such as ambitious MEAs, may be further dampened by the fact that international environmental law has come on the radar screen of those who are concerned about the encroachment of international law on US sovereignty. International institutions such as MEAs and their COPs play increasingly important roles, and international environmental law is seen as having a growing impact on domestic affairs. Therefore, MEAs are liable to become entangled in wider concerns about loss of control by democratically elected and accountable domestic officials.
Direct evidence of these concerns can be found in Senate deliberations on multilateral environmental agreements. For example, some objections to ratification of the Biodiversity Convention were based on the fact that the COP 'will meet after [the] treaty [is] in force to negotiate the details of the treaty', which would contravene the Senate's 'constitutional responsibilities to concur in treaties'. 187 Senator Conrad Burns (R-MT) observed: 'This treaty could give a panel outside the United States the right to dictate what our environmental laws should say. That is wrong. ' 188 Senator Jesse Helms, in remarks that show a considerable grasp of the dynamics that can be generated by the framework-protocol model of treaty-making, opined:
This so-called treaty is scarcely more than a mere preamble, not a treaty. The real treaty -the essential nuts and bolts -is yet to be created at the conference of the parties. If the Senate previously ratifies this preamble falsely described as a treaty, it will have given away one of its major constitutional authorities and will have betrayed the trust of the American people. 189 One may be inclined to discount this salvo as the extreme view of a notorious, arch-conservative foe of international law. However, while arguably not a majority view, 190 similar concerns are now expressed in many quarters. For example, Curtis Bradley argues that some transfers of authority to international institutions raise constitutional concerns. 191 Terry Anderson and J. Bishop Grewell describe MEAs as 'genuine threats' to American sovereignty, 192 and opine that increasing international environmental regulation 'reduces accountability that comes from a country's internal system of checks and balances, and increases international tension'.
Indeed, it appears that reservations regarding international law are now shared across the political spectrum and are embraced by conservative and liberal commentators alike. 194 Jed Rubenfeld, a center-left constitutional law scholar, recently caused a stir arguing that American democratic constitutionalism must lead to the conclusion that 'international law is a threat to democracy and to the hopes of democratic politics around the world'. 195 According to Rubenfeld, as 'the international system became more powerful, and international law diverged from U.S. law, the United States inevitably began to show unilateralist tendencies '. 196 Most chillingly, Rubenfeld argues that:
Unilateralism does not set its teeth against international cooperation or coalition building. What it does set its teeth against is the shift that occurs when such cooperation takes the form of binding agreements administered, interpreted, and enforced by multilateral bodies -the shift, in other words, from international cooperation to international law. 197 In this assessment, Rubenfeld comes surprisingly close to the views of neoconservative members and supporters of the Bush administration. 198 From the standpoint of international environmental law, Rubenfeld's assessment is also deeply ironic. If it is any yardstick of what to expect from the United States, the more that international environmental law grows and the more successful environmental regime building is, the more resistance it is likely to meet. But the irony does not end here. Even assuming that treaties can cause constitutional difficulties in the United States, it is not clear that MEAs raise these issues as much as other branches of international law. Concerns about democratic control might be raised by the phenomenon of law-making in COPs that was mentioned earlier. 199 To the extent that COP decisions necessitate domestic regulatory or policy activity, their non-binding nature would allow the by-passing of the Senate process. This is precisely the concern raised by Senator Helms and others. However, other concerns, such as the notion that 'foreign panels' would 'dictate' US environmental law, vastly overestimate the reach of MEAs. In any case, it seems that treaties in other areas, notably trade law, have much greater potential to raise constitutional concerns in this regard. 200 Indeed, in his review of potentially problematic transfers of authority to international institutions, Curtis Bradley does not include a single MEA, but focuses on trade agreements and institutions such as the UN Security Council and the World Court. 201 It appears, therefore, that the apprehension vis-à-vis MEAs is at least in part coloured by generic concerns about international law, which may or may not apply to MEAs. It is also likely that these attitudes are reinforced by a broader sense that stronger, more demanding MEAs constrain American freedom of action. It certainly seems to be the case that MEAs now often promote policy approaches that do not fit neatly into US domestic agendas or accord with existing US law, as was the case for some of the early MEAs on which the US led negotiations and then moved quickly to ratification. 202 Whatever the precise dynamics, the features that have given international environmental lawyers cause to cheer the development of MEAs also place them in the cross-hairs of an apparently growing range of sceptics in the United States. By the same token, the search for alternative approaches to international environmental protection is likely to find increasing support in US international policy circles. This conclusion suggests itself, in particular, in view of the fact that several of the alternative strategies appear to be premised upon widening the circle of those states that share the US outlook on democracy, rule of law and, ultimately, international law.
D National Security
The misgivings about international law and multilateral institutions, and the inclination towards alternative approaches, have likely been heightened by the post-September 11 preoccupation with national security. 203 Arguably, this preoccupation has also entailed a shift of public concern and a shift of resources away from environmental issues. At any rate, all indications are that environmental and natural resource issues have become security issues. Some issues have been explicitly cast as matters of national security, as the Bush administration has done with American 'energy security'. 204 But the systematic weaving of environmental concerns into the security agenda preceded the current Bush administration. Already the Clinton administration pushed strongly for a new, broader vision of foreign policy and national security. 205 This push was flanked by a rise of 'environmental security' analysis in the scholarly literature. 206 The initial goals of environmental security rhetoric most certainly included the elevation of environmental degradation on policy and funding agendas. However, after September 11, it appears that many environmental issues have become subordinated to security considerations. The American Under-Secretary of State for Global Affairs, Paula Dobriansky expressed the underlying assumptions as follows:
Many problems that used to be considered individually, such as environmental disputes, health-related issues, migration flows, narcotics trafficking, and trafficking in persons, among others, must now be viewed as integral to national security and stability. We have gone from a world where we assess our safety based on how we handle one large danger to one in which we must handle numerous, individual concerns. 207 This thinking is also implicit in the Bush administration's 2002 National Security Strategy. 208 The document makes reference to environmental concerns only in the context of the need to promote free markets and free trade. Because a strong world economy advances 'prosperity and freedom in the rest of the world', it is said to be inextricably linked to US national security. 209 As part of a 'comprehensive' free trade strategy, the Security Strategy highlights the need to '[p]rotect the environment and workers'.
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E American Power, Multilateralism and Unilateralism
The current American preoccupation with national security intersects with the desire to maintain and enhance US power in the post-Cold War world. At least in part, current policy-makers are driven by the sense that 'in today's world, we still need a sheriff, and that only the United States can play such a role'. 211 In turn, there is a keen sense that a 'realistic sheriff' cannot rely exclusively, or even primarily, on military power to accomplish its goals. 212 Therefore, the United States must harness and develop what Joseph Nye has called 'soft power', which means 'getting others to want what you want', and 'rests on the ability to set the political agenda in a way that shapes the preferences of others'. 213 A critical source of soft power, argues Nye, is the 'ability to establish a set of favorable rules and institutions that govern areas of international activity'. 214 And this seems to be precisely the policy that the Bush administration has been pursuing, whether successfully or not. In a 2002 speech, the State Department's then Director of Policy Planning, Richard Haass, offered the following observations:
In the 21st century, the principal aim of American foreign policy is to integrate other countries and organizations into arrangements that will sustain a world consistent with U.S. interests and values, and thereby promote peace, prosperity, and justice as widely as possible.. . . We are doing this by persuading more and more governments and, at a deeper level, people to sign on to certain key ideas as to how the world should operate for our mutual benefit. 215 The United States, as a 'resourceful sheriff', must be a coalition builder. 216 Depending on the issue at hand, the 'coalitions of the willing' may be broadly multilateral. 217 But, increasingly, they may not be. Both the regional environmental hub approach and the emphasis on public-private partnerships for sustainable development also fit neatly into what Richard Haass has called the 'doctrine of integration'. 218 From the standpoint of international environmental law, the key question is what this self-declared 'distinctly American internationalism' 219 will mean for MEAs and other efforts to structure global environmental governance. As suggested earlier, it is relatively harder for the United States to shape policy outcomes within multilateral regimes. Thus, regional or country-specific approaches may be seen as more direct and effective ways to project soft power. 220 At another level, they are simply sensible responses to the diffusion of actors and arenas that characterizes globalization, in the environmental as in other fields. In any case, it is to be expected that the United States will continue to promote 'U.S. interests and values' at multiple levels. But all the focus on regional or public-private approaches notwithstanding, multilateral environmental regimes will also remain part of the policy picture. Quite apart from the fact that some environmental problems cannot be solved but through multilateral engagement, it is arguable that the very importance of soft power will keep the United States tied into MEAs and other regimes. Eventually, these facts may even bring the United States back into the climate change regime.
Although the withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol remains an isolated step in American MEA practice, it is routinely cited, along with the rejection of the International Criminal Court and of certain arms control treaties, as evidence of a broader pattern of not just US selective multilateralism, but of a growing inclination to exempt itself from standards applicable to others. 221 Few observers outside the United States have been swayed by the US claim that it is simply looking to move beyond a flawed treaty. A number of factors explain this phenomenon. Non-participation in Kyoto is not simply a matter of lacking or slow domestic progress towards ratification. The Bush administration took the unusual step of formally declaring its opposition to the protocol. 222 Its blunt dismissal of the protocol came after more than a decade of active involvement in the climate change negotiations, and after considerable success in shaping many parts of the regime according to American preferences. 223 But, more than that, given the treaty's entry into force formula, US non-ratification placed significant hurdles in the path of the treaty ever taking effect. 224 In addition, even if the protocol enters into force, it will do so without participation of the largest emitter of global greenhouse gases. 225 The US decision on Kyoto, therefore, concerns not merely its own position vis-à-vis the treaty, but has significant effects on the effectiveness or even the existence of the treaty as such. 226 The perils of American 'à la carte multilateralism', have manifested themselves on many fronts over the last few years. 227 But there are few better illustrations than the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol and the responses that this -perfectly legal -step provoked. Ultimately, soft power rests on credibility. 228 In this context, it matters that the Kyoto withdrawal is widely seen as part of a broader pattern. A country's ability to get others to want what it wants will be diminished if it is perceived as a purely self-interested actor, which is precisely what current US climate change policy invites. In addition, over-reliance on coalitions of the willing, be it in the environmental context or beyond, undermines rather than enhances perception of the United States as a trustworthy, good faith actor. 229 This assessment applies in particular to US relations with European and other states that perceive a duty to cooperate to be at the very heart of the international legal order. 230 Therefore, even the Bush administration will likely have to adjust its approach to international law in view of its inherent limits. However, it is unlikely that such adjustments would have beneficial effects for the climate change regime. American re-engagement, be it in the Kyoto Protocol or in a new treaty, 231 arguably will have to wait for a new American administration. 232 The many state and local climate change initiatives that have been launched in the face of federal inaction may come to play an important role in assisting this move. 233 A recently publicized report commissioned by the Department of Defense, which argues that rapid climate change 'should be elevated beyond a scientific debate to a US national security concern', may also enter into the equation.
234
F Willingness to Think Outside the Box
A final factor to consider in these reflections on US involvement in international environmental law is American readiness to experiment with new approaches and to think outside the box. Climate change, again, provides examples; one illustrating the American potential for generating innovative solutions, the other suggesting that the American approach to international problem-solving is also closely linked to US power and attitudes towards international law.
The US role as an innovator is nicely illustrated through its promotion of international emissions trading and of a 'comprehensive approach', covering several major greenhouse gases and their sources and sinks, to help states meet emission reduction commitments. 235 In the case of emissions trading, it is often assumed that the United States simply advocated an approach that it had employed domestically. However, Jonathan Wiener offers a detailed account of how proposals for international emissions trading were developed by the Department of Justice in response to a request by the first Bush administration for new ideas for US climate policy. 236 While the emissions trading idea did draw inspiration from domestic practice, the approach was carefully adapted to the international setting, so as to promote broad participation and economic efficiency. 237 Ultimately, Wiener agrees that the lack of emission reductions commitments for large developing countries such as China, India, Brazil or Indonesia, is a flaw in the Kyoto Protocol. For the protocol to work in the longer term, he suggests, these countries should have been attracted into the regime by giving them 'head-room' emission allowances that would have permitted them to trade some of their emission rights -as was done for Russia. 238 It is ironic that the United States walked away from a Kyoto Protocol that contains much of its innovation. Yet, can the decision to withdraw too be put down to American willingness to think outside the box? This is certainly the conclusion that President Bush wanted the world to draw when he cast the American decision to abandon a flawed treaty as an act of leadership. 239 Others have suggested that the silver lining in the American repudiation of Kyoto is an opportunity to acknowledge the treaty's shortcomings and to think afresh and start a new dialogue on 240 See Bodansky, 'Bonn Voyage: Kyoto's Uncertain Revival', The National Interest (Fall 2001) 65. See also source cited in supra note 231. 241 Zelikow, supra note 9, at 25. 242 Ibid. One might object, of course, that the Bush administration's foreign policy is driven much more by abstract principles and ideology than by assessment of actual developments. I thank Dan Bodansky for this observation. 243 See also Koh, supra note 106, at 1449 (referring to the Bush administration's 'strategic unilateralism and tactical multilateralism').
international approaches to climate change. 240 Be that as it may, given the absence of a constructive alternative proposal by the Bush administration, its assertion of leadership is difficult to take at face value. Nonetheless, sympathetic observers have suggested that the Bush administration 'prefers functional institutions that produce concrete results instead of symbolic measures', adding that '[s]ometimes, as in the case of the Kyoto Protocol, well-meaning but dysfunctional efforts may be worse than useless if they complicate attempts to develop a more effective solution'. 241 Indeed, in policy-making, the Bush administration is said to prefer 'an inductive method that draws ideas from many sources and adapts them to specific conditions', as opposed to deductive strategies that develop abstract principles 'into generic, universal solutions'. 242 It is precisely at this point that innovation, power, and attitudes towards international law and institutions intersect. The focus is on the ends more than the means, leading back to the 'distinctly American internationalism' discussed in the previous section. In other words, under the Bush administration, the American willingness to innovate relates not just to solutions to individual problems, it also appears to animate, and be animated by, the way in which the United States engages with international law.
243
Conclusion
While the high-profile withdrawal of the United States from the Kyoto Protocol may be indicative of broader policy preferences of the current US administration, it is not representative of US policy towards multilateral environmental agreements. American compliance with treaty commitments is generally good. Although the United States has been less likely to lead in the development of international environmental regimes, it remains actively involved in most MEA negotiations and usually works to shape the emerging regimes. But whereas, in the 1970s and into the 1980s, the United States proceeded quickly to join multilateral treaties it had helped negotiate, ratification now tends to take several years, or may be altogether uncertain. That said, due to domestic political processes and other factors, the ratification trajectory of the Bush administration is no worse than that of preceding administrations. The Bush administration has been working towards domestic approval for ratification of several MEAs, notably in the area of chemicals management. Finally, in the case of some of the most recent agreements, the United States finds itself in the company of other developed countries that have yet to join.
If the United States has been sluggish in its ratification of MEAs, it has been less enthusiastic about the development of customary international environmental law. Although the United States supports the design of individual international regimes around new concepts, such as the precautionary principle or the common but differentiated responsibilities, it resists claims that they have become customary law.
Increasingly, the United States has sought to identify alternative legal avenues for shaping relevant policy agendas. The United States appears to be exploring unilateral approaches, but is unclear whether or not explicit legal unilateralism will emerge as a major trend in the environmental context. By contrast, it is clear that the United States is shifting significant legal, policy and financial resources into regional arenas and into public-private partnerships, respectively. Although it has been articulated and pursued most forcefully by the Bush administration, this shift in resources and approaches has been underway for at least a decade.
The reasons for this policy pattern are multifaceted. Some, such as the current national security preoccupation or the world view of the Bush administration, may be temporary factors. But, just like the policy pattern itself, many others -such as domestic political processes, attitudes towards international law, or willingness to try alternative approaches -transcend administrations. The trick for international environmental lawyers and policy-makers will be to distinguish the elephant's 'twitch and grunt' from movements that must be taken seriously as longer-term trends.
